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B. Del worth Gardner.
H this paper is the best challenge that can be brought against the
New Resource Economics (NRE) and its advocacy for privatization of
the public lands, we are likely to see both around for a long time. If
there is fallacy in the idea of privatization, it is not illuminated in the
arguments of this article. The paper misrepresents what the NRE is,
shows little comprehension of the basic concepts on which it rests,
and completely reverses the basic nature of the privatization solution.
I hope to demonstrate as much in this critique.
To permit the identification of the main points of confusion and
disagreement in the paper, let me briefly recapitulate what I believe
are the essential elements of Runge's argument. I could cite chapter.
and verse, but that is unnecessary since there is little doubt where he
stands.
Because the public lands are owned by the people as a whole, they
are a "commons," and therefore the NRE alleges that they are subject
to all the problems inherent with common property resources. They
will be overexploited because of free riders: "each individual demands more than his or her fair share of the benefits of a common
resource." This occurs because in considering the taking of another
unit of output (such as a grazing animal), a myopic individual sees
only the costs and benefits to him of adding this unit. He neglects to
see the added costs his action imposes on all other. users of the
resource because there will now be less forage to go around Thus total
costs wiH be underestimated and resource use will extend beyond the
economically efficient level where marginal benefits equal marginal
costs.
Moreover, bureaucrats who make the allocative· decisions are
"rent-seekers"; i.e., they "use the coercive power of government to
favor a few privileged groups at the expense of the taxpayers." In the
process they get larger budget allocations and other favors for themselves and their bureaus. Both rent-seeking and free-riding misallocate resources. The solution to these problems of resource overexploitation and misallocation as seen by the NRE is privatization of the
public lands. But according to Runge, th1s must involve the imposition
by the state of coercive private property rights, a solution that is antilibertarian because it rules out a prized principle of libertarian and
conservative thought-voluntarism. Thus, the professed libertarian
NRE is caught in a contra_diction-advocating a top-down imposition of private rights by a tyrannical state. A true libertarian solution
would involve voluntary agreements by those parties who are closest
to the resources and who know most about them: individuals. and
local and state i'nterests. Besides, and to cement the case against priyatization, what evidence there is suggests that publicly owned
resources are more productive than are privately owned resources.
Thus there is nothing to be gained and much to be lost from substitut. ing private ownership for public ownership.
What is wrong witn this argument? Quite a bit, it appears to me.
The NRE rests on much 'more than just "free-riding" and "rentseeking," even if they were correctly defined. Perhaps its most funda-

mental premise is narctly even ment10ned in the Runge paper: that
incentives matter in resource-use decisions. Incentives interact with
utility functions to yield subjective preferences t h a t ~ all human
behavior, even that of government officials. All decision-makers are
assumed to be rational in that they tend to make decisions that they
. perceive to be in their self-interest. Incentives and property rights are
closely intertwined since it is property rights that define who can
benefit from the productivity of. resources and who must bear the
responsibility of ownership.
If property rights do not exist-i.e., if no one can be excluded from
claiming benefits from the resources-then the free-rider problem
could exist. Runge's position ~ seems to equate free-riding with
open access to resources could be challenged. but I would not push the
point too far. He is quite correct in pointing out that the NRE believes
that free-riding (open access) usually leads to overexploitation of
resources. But private property rights greatly ameliorate the free-riding problem. 1 That is why they appeal to the NRE. Free riders cannot
impose costs on the owners of resources with impunity if cle~r property rights exist. Either the parties voluntarily negotiate their
differences,. or somebody gets taken to court. In this way, private
property rights internalize the external effects associated with the
free-riding problem. And for efficient elimination of these effects, it
doesn't really matter who owns the resources so long as someone
does. 2 This bargaining incentive is the very essence of the kind of
voluntarism that Runge identifies with libertarianism. But he fails to
see that clear property rights are a prerequisite for _it to occur.
He also misses a more important problem with public ownership,
an issue that has become one of the hallmarks of the NRE. Resources
are seldom if ever strictli price-allocated under governmental management. They are allocated by bureaucratic decision in the political
arena.3 Many products, such as most forms of recreation, are available
at very nominal or zero prices. Is it any wonder that excess demand
exists and the resources sometimes may be overtaxed?
Political decisions are bound to be economically inefficient. Economic efficiency requires that resources be allocated to those who
value them most highly. It also requires that investment in resource
development and productivity enhancement be undertaken to the
point where marginal costs equal marginal benefits. There is nothing
in the political process that requires that these criteria be taken
seriously. The New Resource economists tell us that private ownership of the resources would be conducive to the rationing of resources
by price and thus would likely be efficient. If private owners did not
manage the resources efficiently, it would cost them in foregone
wealth. The same could be said for inadequate attention to conservation and resource protection. There is nothing like these incentives in
public-sector management. .
This brings me to Runge's discussion of "rent-seeking." He clearly
does not ·understand this concept in the context of its development in
the literature·or its use by the NRE. 4 He suggests that it is the bureau-·
crats who are the rent-seekers-"government employees such as
public land managers, who extract 'rent' from the public in the form
of larger budget allocations." Not so.
Very broadly defined, economic rent is generated when a product
is worth more to the user than is paid to obtain it It is a surplus to producers and consumers who receive it. When resources are allocated
by political fia_t, and especially when only nominal or no prices are
·charged, the economic rents can be enormous. Who gets these rents is
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them continued under public management. This is the reason for the
lobbying and other political activity that is intended. to influence the
political decision-makers and make sure that the public largesse continues. Thus it is the special-interest groups who benefit from political
decisions, and who are the rent-seekers in the NRE model. Of course
the government bureaucrats and politicians may also benefit frorr,
this rent-seeking activity and therefore encourage it.
An efficiency problem results because rent-seeking is a competitive
activity. The rent-seekers might be willing to spend up to the value of
the rents rather than go without them. They spend in various forms:
lobbying, contributions to political campaigns, public information
drives to curry public favor, etc. The point is that this activity has the
tendency to dissipate the rent itself, since it is now more costly to obtain the valuable surplus. Anyone who knows of the lobbying activities of the water developers, the energy companies, the graziers,
the wilderness buffs, or the wildlife harvesters (to name a few obvious
rent recipients) will have no difficulty understanding the
phenomenon. This is why the NRE has referred to political allocations (transfers) as a negative sum game,6 whereas private decisions to
move resources to more productive employments are essentially a
positive sum game that enhances the productivity of resour.ces. Rentseeking is a wasteful activity, profit-seeking a productive activity.
One takes place predominantly in political allocations, the other predominantly in market allocations. Thus the one characterizes allocations made under public ownership of the public lands, while the
other would characterize decisions if the land were privately owned.
Runge seems to be totally unaware of these fundamental distinctions.
Finally, Runge is just plain wrong in arguing that the creation of
private property rights involves a top-down authoritarian government decision that is inconsistent with libertarian principles. It is
true, as Runge points out, that Hardin suggested that one of the solutions to problems of the commons was imposed state control. Regulation by government of private activity is a favorite means of this control. But creating private property rights, backed up by constitutional·
guarantees, is not a regulatory activity but _is the enforcement of the
rules of the game under which private enterprise is played. It is not
the same as imposed top-down regulation of private decisions.
Runge's discussion of the allegect empirical superiority of the productivity of public grazing lands versus private grazing lands is also
not convincing. First of all, range condition is a very slippery concept,
as any range specialist will tell you. In addition, there is a problem'of
choice of criteria to determine what is optimal. Most ranchers are interested in the economic product that can be taken off the land in perpetuity in the form of logs, pounds of beef or lamb, and the like. Many
public managers,. trained in biology and ecology, tend to look at
biological criteria such as climax vegetation, which may be maximized when there is no economic product taken. That is one of the
criticisms levied against public ownership by the NRE: sometimes too
little product is taken and sometimes too much. This is true withJi!:!i:_
ber, grass, energy fuels, and minerals, and it has been carefully documented in a number of studies.7 The reason is obvious: political rather
than economic rationales now guide land-use decisions on the public
lands.
If we want higher levels of productivity and greater yields from
our- forests and grazing lands, the conclusions of the NRE still stand.
We are far more likely to get them from private ownership and management than from continued public ownership and management.
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